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“Democracy begins in conversation.”
1
John Dewey
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
2
Community School District did for the ideal of expressive freedom in
3
America’s public schools what Brown v. Board of Education did for the
ideal of racial equality. It made a core value of the Bill of Rights
∗ Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. Jamin B.
Raskin is a professor of constitutional law and a State Senator in Maryland. He cofounded the Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy Project, which has sent
hundreds of law students into public high schools across America to teach about the
Constitution. He is the author of WE THE STUDENTS (3d ed. 2008) and OVERRULING
DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (2003).
This Article is dedicated to the grown-up Mary Beth Tinker, whose passion for
freedom, justice, and peace remains exemplary, and to Tabitha Claire Raskin, who
was sent to detention for courageously objecting to “silent lunch” on behalf of all of
her classmates.
1. JAMES T. FARRELL ET AL., DIALOGUE ON JOHN DEWEY 58 (Corliss Lamont ed.,
1959).
2. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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spring to life for young people facing authoritarian treatment at the
4
hands of adult officials running their school systems. By privileging
the right of students to engage in passionate political communication
over the school’s interest in maintaining discipline or the
community’s interest in maintaining pro-war consensus, the Tinker
decision was a decisive victory for what Robert Post has called
“democracy” values over “management” and “community” values
5
within a key institutional setting.
For its dramatic infusion of democratic speech values into a classic
authoritarian relationship—that between powerful adults and
powerless children in an institutional setting—the Tinker decision was
6
remarkable at its inception. But the true First Amendment meaning
of the decision travels well beyond the schoolhouse gate and has yet
to be recognized, much less realized.
When Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, upheld thirteen-yearold Mary Beth Tinker’s First Amendment right to wear a black
antiwar armband to school, he found that schools may not be
7
“enclaves of totalitarianism” and declared institutional censorship of
student expression invalid unless a school can demonstrate that the
speech causes a “substantial disruption of or material interference
8
with” the educational process or “impinge[s] upon the rights of
9
other students.” This strict standard for reviewing censorship within
the public school, our paradigm social institution, implies that other
public institutions must similarly incorporate the norms of robust
dissent and free dialogue into their own operations.

4. Indeed, Kristi Bowman’s excellent contribution to this symposium
demonstrates that, in our history, the struggle for freedom of speech for students has
been organically intertwined with the struggle for racial justice at school. See Kristi L.
Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1129
(2009).
5. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 1–2 (1995) (“Three distinct forms of social order are especially
relevant to understanding our constitutional law.
I call these community,
management, and democracy. . . . [O]ne might say that law creates community when
it seeks authoritatively to interpret and enforce shared mores and norms; it is
managerial when it organizes social life instrumentally to achieve specific objectives;
and it fosters democracy by establishing the social arrangements that carry for us the
meaning of collective self-determination.”).
6. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (“School officials do not possess absolute authority
over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under
our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must
respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State. . . . In the
absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their
speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.”).
7. Id. at 511.
8. Id. at 514.
9. Id. at 509.
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To be more precise, if freedom of expression is the default
presumption at school, which is addressed to the intellectual
upbringing of children, surely social institutions governing adults—the
university, the workplace (public and private), the military, the
prison, the election campaign process and political debate, the
shopping center—must also respect the freedom of speech of citizenparticipants unless such exercise would thwart the basic purposes and
functions of the institution. The Tinker formula, which protects
speech that does not substantially disrupt functional operations or
10
violate the rights of other participants, harmonizes the managerial
power of democratic government to accomplish its ends through
social institutions with the cross-cutting sovereign freedom of
democratic citizens to speak inside these institutions. Tinker is the
“inside” speech correlate to the “outside” speech principle of
11
Brandenburg v. Ohio, which protects all speech in the street (or
elsewhere in society outside of specific institutional contexts), that is
12
not likely (or intended) to “incit[e] . . . imminent lawless action.”
But the striking implications of the Tinker formula remain vastly
unrealized. The freedom to speak in most social institutions is not
the default standard suspended in rare and extreme cases but rather
a weak and secondary value regularly subordinated to the foreground
interests of authority, property, hierarchy, punishment and
retribution, militarism, social order, political stability, and
13
commercial profit.
We can see how the constitutional right of free speech is constantly
balanced into oblivion against weighty social interests by the way that
the school cases themselves have unfolded since Tinker was decided.
Part II of this Article thus examines the roots and meaning of the
powerful libertarian doctrine of Tinker and then canvasses how the
doctrine has been eroded (much like the egalitarian vision of Brown)
10. Id. at 513 (holding that a student “may express his opinions, even on
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without ‘materially
and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school’ and without colliding with the rights of others” (quoting
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)) (alteration in the original)).
11. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
12. Id. at 447 (striking down the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute, which
criminalized advocacy of violence to effect political and economic change).
13. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988)
(holding that school officials retained the right to censor student speech in high
school newspapers for any reasonable pedagogical purpose). See generally BRUCE
BARRY, SPEECHLESS: THE EROSION OF FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE
(2007) (criticizing employers’ broad discretion to fire workers for engaging in free
speech that makes the employer uncomfortable even when the speech is unrelated to
the employee’s job).
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by the sharp undertow of sympathy for authoritarian structure on the
Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts. The conservative Court has
carved out major exceptions to Tinker in the interests of social
conformity, sexual prudishness, protection of sensitive adults’
14
feelings, and promotion of ideological unity for drug prohibition.
Part III explores how a traveling Tinker principle differs from the
illiberal doctrines of speech regulation and suppression that govern
other institutional settings, focusing illustratively on the public sector
workplace and the military. Part IV concludes by arguing that the
current weakness of the Tinker commitment undermines democratic
progress both in public schools and in other public institutions. The
way to renew the momentum of the decision is to shift rhetorical
emphasis from the more manipulable “material and substantial
interference” prong of the Tinker standard to the “invasion of the
15
rights of others” prong. Although consideration of the former has
tended to subsume the latter, my hope is that doctrinal focus on
concrete individual rights at stake will liberate courts from a tendency
to validate abstract invocations of state interests as justifying
censorship.
II. EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY: THE TRIUMPH OF TINKER
The Tinker decision marked an historic triumph for intellectual
freedom at school. Justice Abe Fortas insisted that the case could not
be decided simply by roping off institutions of public education from
the force field of the Bill of Rights. He wrote: “It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
16
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”
In addressing this threshold question of the constitutional status of
people entering public schools, Justice Fortas fortunately did not
write on a blank blackboard. For even before Tinker gave students
the right to speak their conscience at school, another great wartime
school speech decision, West Virginia State Board of Education v.
17
Barnette, had given them the right not to have to speak against
14. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (holding
that the school district did not violate a student’s First Amendment rights when it
suspended him for using lewd language during a school assembly, given that “it is a
highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar
and offensive terms in public discourse”); see also Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,
2625 (2007) (holding that a high school principal did not violate a student’s right to
free speech when she confiscated his “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner at an offcampus, school-sanctioned event).
15. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511, 513.
16. Id. at 506.
17. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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conscience at school. This decision created the framework for Tinker
by establishing the First Amendment rights of students at school as an
important component of democratic freedom under the
18
Constitution.
The Barnette children were Jehovah’s Witnesses who refused for
19
religious reasons to pledge allegiance to the flag at school. It took
unknown courage for them to sit it out in small-town West Virginia in
the middle of World War II. The Supreme Court in Minersville School
20
District v. Gobitis had just three years prior rejected a First
Amendment attack on the pledge salute, and Witnesses across the
country were facing official reprisals and vigilante harassment for
21
their refusal to join in.
But Justice Robert Jackson came to their aid, writing the Supreme
Court’s first great student rights decision and, in the process,
defining the anti-authoritarian premises of American democracy with
more clarity than any Supreme Court justice had ever done. Taken
seriously, his words make the First Amendment the guardian of the
people’s sovereignty over both their own minds and their own
government:
There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of
the nature or origin of its authority. We set up government by
consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in
power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here
is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by
22
authority.

If public opinion controls government, the Free Speech Clause
operates like a secular anti-establishment clause, heading off at every
turn establishment of political and ideological orthodoxy. The
citizenry must be sovereign over its own consciousness. In Justice
18. Id. at 642 (invalidating a West Virginia Board of Education resolution
requiring all school children to salute the American flag and recite the Pledge of
Allegiance as a violation of the First Amendment).
19. Id. at 629 (explaining that Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse to salute the flag
because they consider it a “graven image,” whose worship is proscribed in Exodus
20:4–5).
20. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
21. For a fascinating and important discussion of how the Court reversed itself
and moved from the authoritarian premises of Gobitis to the libertarian premises of
Barnette in three years during World War II—with a crucial push from President
Franklin D. Roosevelt—see Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise in
Presidential Leadership, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 363, 382 (2008) (arguing that Roosevelt
placed rhetorical pressure on the Court to change its mind as freedom of
conscience, thought, and worship were essential to defining the American position in
the war against Nazism and fascism).
22. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
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Jackson’s now immortal words: “If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
”23
their faith therein.
Thus, in democracy, the citizen occupies the
highest office in the land, and public officials are public servants who
cannot dictate political dogma to their masters: the people. This
framing sets the table for understanding the presumptive sovereign
free speech rights of the people as they move, work and act in every
social institution.
Yet as important as Barnette was, it was Tinker that actually
proclaimed the right of America’s children to speak out at school.
After all, the Jehovah’s Witnesses were religionists minding their own
business and wanted only to be left alone; they were playing defense.
But angelic-looking Mary Beth Tinker was an outspoken American
rebel from the heartland, a precocious free spirit directly challenging
in wartime the authority of the President, the military-industrial
complex, and her school principal, who had gotten wind of her
24
protest and hastily promulgated a rule banning black armbands.
But Mary Beth, joined by her brother John and their friend Chris
Eckhardt, insisted on expressing solidarity for Senator Robert
25
Kennedy’s call for a Christmas truce in Vietnam. Defiant, she wore
her black armband to school on December 16, 1965, making it to
26
third period before she was sent down the hall. She refused to
27
remove the armband and was suspended. Her family received death
28
threats and had red paint splashed on their front door. But the
Tinkers hung tough and, with the help of the American Civil
Liberties Union, took their case to the Supreme Court.
23. Id. at 642.
24. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969)
(stating that, upon learning of petitioners’ plans to wear black armbands from
December 16 through New Year’s Day to publicize their objection to the Vietnam
War, the principals of the Des Moines schools met and instituted a ban on armbands
on December 14).
25. Mary Beth Tinker, I Could Not Sit By and Watch This Happening (May 6,
1992), available at http://www.rightsmatter.org/multimedia/personal_stories/mary_
beth_tinker.html.
26. Id. (“After lunch I went to algebra and my teacher was waiting at the door.
He told me to go to the office. At the office, I was suspended and went home.”).
27. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (stating that the students, who were suspended until
they agreed to remove their armbands, only returned to school after the planned
period for wearing armbands had expired—New Year’s Day).
28. Alice Ollstein, Off the Cuff: First Amendment Activist Mary Beth Tinker, OBERLIN
REV., May 9, 2008, http://www.oberlin.edu/cgi-bin/cgiwrap/ocreview/20080509.
php?a=n_off_the&sec=news (describing the community’s reaction to Tinker’s protest
and subsequent lawsuit).
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At stake in Tinker, according to the school district, was nothing less
than every school principal’s power to maintain order against the
29
anarchy threatened by children exercising political speech rights.
The argument, again in Robert Post’s terms, depended on the
assertion of official state “management” interests over the discursive
30
and interactive values of “democracy.”
But Justice Fortas perceived the infinitely elastic nature of this
argument and declared that schools can never censor out of a “mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
31
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” Rather, a school seeking to
censor must show that a student’s speech will “materially and
substantially interfere[] with the requirements of appropriate
32
discipline in the operation of the school,” which means “material[]
disrupt[ion of] classwork or . . . substantial disorder or invasion of the
33
rights of others.” This standard creates the “inside” correlate to the
“outside” principle of Brandenburg v. Ohio, which was decided also by
the Court in 1969 and protects all speech in the street (or elsewhere
in the society outside of specific institutional contexts) that is not
34
intended and likely to “incit[e] . . . imminent lawless action.” The
decisions are congruent since the larger society can repress speech
only if it seriously and imminently threatens the legal order itself, and
an institution within society can repress speech only if it seriously and
imminently threatens the essential functions of the institution as set
forth in law and policy.
Needless to say, Mary Beth’s principal asserted that her black
armband was disruptive. But Justice Fortas found that, under the
First Amendment, schools may not simply equate dissent with
disruption. “In our system,” he wrote, “state-operated schools may
not be enclaves of totalitarianism,” and “students may not be
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of
”35
those sentiments that are officially approved. Rather, a school must have
29. Brief for Respondents at 33, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (No. 21), 1968 WL 112603 (“No one can accurately judge what
might have happened if the school administration had not acted so swiftly. There
have been enough other similar demonstrations in schools, particularly in the
colleges, that the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the consequences
could have been serious if the demonstration had not been stopped almost before it
got started.”).
30. See POST, supra note 5, at 1–2.
31. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
32. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
33. Id. at 513.
34. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
35. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (emphasis added).
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a compelling reason for silencing students, and “undifferentiated fear
or apprehension of disturbance” can never be “enough to overcome
36
the right to freedom of expression.”
Significantly, the Court’s sweeping analysis advanced not only a
constitutional theory of democratic rights but a democratic theory of
education. Mary Beth was not to be the “closed-circuit” recipient of
information drilled into her mind by the school board. As a student,
she must be treated as an active and responsive participant in the
learning process. Education is not something that the school system
does to the student. It is what takes place when the community forms
and investigates different facets of the world. Each student has
something precious to offer the rest of the class and
“intercommunication among the students” is not only “inevitable”
37
but “an important part of the educational process.” Indeed, the free
exchange of thoughts and feelings among students “is not confined
to the supervised and ordained discussion which takes place in the
classroom,” but spills over to the whole school day, including athletic,
38
extracurricular, and informal events.
This analysis suggests that
Mary Beth could not be punished either for something controversial
she said in class discussion, or for something she said in the
interstices of the official school day when students are enjoying “free
time.”
This subtle rendering of the school experience in democratic
society closely resembles the thinking of John Dewey, who argued
that students learn equally from the “formal” curriculum and the
“informal” curriculum generated in the nooks and crannies of the
school day, where banter, jokes, talk of current events, laughter,
gossip, interaction with teachers, and the full play of social life
39
acquaint students with cultural values and political ideas.
Far from disrupting the overall educational process, Mary Beth’s
silent but spirited protest enriched it. A good teacher would have
noted her armband and moved on or even picked up on it to teach
about anything from war powers to post-World War II American
foreign policy, to free speech itself. But there was no constitutional
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 508.
Id. at 512.
Id.
See JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 26, 212 (1922) (arguing that informal education “gives a
clew to the understanding of the subject matter of formal or deliberate instruction”
and that “[t]he development within the young of the attitudes and dispositions
necessary to the continuous and progressive life of a society cannot take place by
direct conveyance of beliefs, emotions, and knowledge. It takes place through the
intermediary of the environment.”).
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reason to fear her expression because there is no educational reason
to fear blurring the boundaries between school and the outside
world. The boundaries are porous and, as Dewey put it, “learning in
40
school should be continuous with that out of school.” Rather than
punishing Mary Beth’s activism, the school ought to have welcomed
it. Dewey wrote: “A progressive society counts individual variations as
41
precious since it finds in them the means of its own growth.” The
important thing is not that all students agree or even that they all feel
comfortable at all times, but rather that they all feel empowered to
think, act and speak for themselves: “[a]ll education which develops
42
power to share effectively in social life is moral.”
Mary Beth’s
principal and teacher lacked the proper sense of democratic
improvisation in the learning process.
In following decades, the awesome libertarian spirit of Tinker
helped move the Court to forbid the removal of books from school
43
libraries for political reasons and to protect the free speech rights of
religious groups obtaining equal access to school facilities after
44
hours. It also began to shift attitudes about student speech in lower
courts and many school systems and prompted some states, like
45
Arkansas, to codify the Tinker standard in state law.
A. The Undertow of Institutional Authoritarianism
But the Court’s hard turn to the right over the years caused it to
reverse course in significant ways. It has carved out meaty exceptions
to the Tinker rule, authorizing school censorship in the context of
“lewd and indecent” student speech (Bethel School District No. 403 v.
46
Fraser); in the context of any “school-sponsored” student speech in
newspapers, yearbooks, assemblies, theater productions, and other
outlets that “the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
47
imprimatur of the school” (Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier);
and, most recently, in the case of student speech that might be

40. Id. at 416.
41. Id. at 357.
42. Id. at 418.
43. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
872 (1982) (invalidating the removal of books from a public school library based on
a hit-list of putatively vulgar and offensive works).
44. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001) (holding the
school district’s exclusion of certain church groups from using school facilities
constituted viewpoint discrimination).
45. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-1204 (2007).
46. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
47. 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
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“reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use” (Morse v.
48
Frederick).
The reasoning of the majority decisions in these cases is
embarrassingly literal-minded. In Fraser, the Court drew up the lewd
and indecent speech exception to uphold suspension and other
discipline of a mischievous student at Bethel High School in Pierce
County, Washington, who gave a nominating speech for a fellow
student running for student government based on—surprise,
surprise!—a sophomoric sexual metaphor. He said, “I know a man
who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character
is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is
49
firm.” Surely the teacher supervising might have rolled his or her
eyes and spoken disapprovingly of wasting the opportunity on such a
vacuous statement.
But suspension—for what?
Are not
Shakespeare’s plays—The Taming of the Shrew and Twelfth Night come
quickly to mind—filled with sexual metaphors, sneaky double
entendres, and bawdy insinuations? Of course, the teenaged culprit
was no Shakespeare in his little riff, but surely a nimble principal
could have told Fraser publically to channel his rudimentary comic
instincts into literature rather than politics, where such speeches do
not fare very well. This would have been a fair, stern, and
educationally meaningful intervention.
But the principal ordered, and the Court affirmed, Fraser’s
50
suspension and other punishment. If the Court had to go in that
direction, Justice William Brennan, in his concurring opinion,
offered the right way to justify it. There was no reason to carve out a
separate category for lewd and indecent speech, he argued, since
Fraser’s speech had arguably “substantially disrupted” the school’s
51
pedagogical mission to teach mature public advocacy. At the very
most, then, Tinker should have been applied, not shoved aside.
All in all, the Fraser case was not a catastrophe, but heavy frontal
damage was inflicted on Tinker in the Hazelwood decision. There,
Principal Robert Reynolds censored two articles, written by students
for their school newspaper and approved by the teacher of the
52
journalism class.
One article concerned the impact of parental
divorce on students and the other was about the problem of teen
pregnancy as seen through the experiences of three pregnant
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2007).
Bethel, 478 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 685 (majority opinion).
Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262.
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students.
Under Tinker and Fraser, the articles were plainly
protected speech and neither disruptive, lewd nor indecent. Indeed,
they were written in a mature and thoughtful way about serious
problems much on the mind of the student body. But the principal
thought that the discussions of sex and birth control in the latter
54
story were “inappropriate for some of the younger students” and
55
that the former story was unbalanced and might invite controversy.
The Court majority found that, while Tinker governs the voluntary
independent speech of students, greater latitude must be granted to
educators to exercise “editorial control over the style and content of
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
56
concerns.”
It promptly found Reynold’s censorship of the
newspaper articles reasonable and not based on viewpoint
57
discrimination. This decision prepares young journalists to be not
only edited by editors but squelched by puritans in power.
The dissenting justices—William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall,
and Harry Blackmun—rallied around the forsaken virtues of Tinker,
observing that the school’s journalism class had itself committed to
publishing all articles that do not “materially and substantially
58
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline.” (It is
indeed instructive to observe that this school, doubtless like many
others, quickly embraced and adopted the intuitive free speech
formula of Tinker after the decision was handed down.)
The dissenters insisted that mere political disagreement between
students and administration should never be sufficient grounds for
59
censoring speech in a school publication. After all, principals do
not own their schools and school publications belong to the school
community itself, which is governed as a state actor by the First
Amendment.
Of course, educators can require students to learn the contents of
a course, but this truism is “the essence of the Tinker test, not an
60
excuse to abandon it,” as the dissenters insisted. They agreed that
high schools do not have to publish student articles that are
“ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 263.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 280 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 283.
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prejudiced” but pointed out that “we need not abandon Tinker to
62
reach that conclusion; we need only apply it.” What is crucial is that
school officials cannot act as political “‘thought police[,]’ stifling
discussion of all but state-approved topics and advocacy of all but the
63
official position.”
If the school principal found fault with the
articles about teen pregnancy and the meaning of divorce for kids, he
had every right in the final analysis to print an institutional disclaimer
or publish opposing views. But he chose to censor instead.
The Hazelwood decision silently revived the old private propertybased conception of speech rights on public lands, which defined the
pre-history of the modern First Amendment. Before the landmark
64
“public forum” cases of the 1930s, like Schneider v. Irvington and
65
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, declared that the
people must have free access to streets, sidewalks, and parks to
engage in speech and protest, the constitutional doctrine held that
managers of public property were like private property owners. In
66
1897, the Supreme Court in Davis v. Massachusetts had ruled that the
officers of a municipal corporation, such as Boston, could arbitrarily
67
exclude disfavored speech from public areas like Boston Common.
Mayors were treated like owners and bosses. Under Hazelwood,
principals enjoy much of the same kind of unbridled power.
Formally, they cannot discriminate against speech based on political
viewpoint, but in reality, they enjoy awesome sway to regulate political
communication.
After Hazelwood, the Court’s 2007 decision in Morse seemed
depressingly predictable, as the Court again exfoliated vast acres of
free expression to kill the mosquito of adolescent humor. The
student culprit in the case, Joseph Frederick, was a high school senior
in Juneau, Alaska, who used the occasion of the Olympic torch relay
to make a bid for national television coverage by unfurling a banner
68
bearing the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” The majority upheld his

61. Id.
62. Id. at 283–84.
63. Id. at 285–86.
64. 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (rejecting the argument that the city’s interest in
keeping streets clean overrides an individual’s right to hand literature to those who
would receive it).
65. 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939) (stating that a citizen’s right to use streets and
parks for communication of views regarding national issues may be regulated but not
abridged or denied).
66. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
67. Id. at 47.
68. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
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ten-day suspension based on a new doctrine, withdrawing First
69
Amendment protection for speech advocating illegal drug use.
It is tempting to dismiss the importance of a case based on such
frivolous events but Stevens’s lucid dissenting opinion points out the
dramatic change effected by the majority in the Morse decision. By
approving “stark” efforts to suppress one side of the national debate
about drugs, the new exception to Tinker discards the Court’s prior
70
commitment to maintaining official viewpoint neutrality at school.
Furthermore, the Court dropped Tinker’s understanding that a
censoring school must show an imminent substantial disruption.
71
Frederick’s “nonsense message” posed no threat of any kind, much
less a threat of immediate substantial disruption. The likely effect of
his silly slogan was plainly nothing. As Stevens memorably put it:
“Most students . . . do not shed their brains at the schoolhouse gate,
72
and most students know dumb advocacy when they see it.”
The broader consequence, Stevens observed, is a severe chill
73
placed on student speech questioning the war on drugs. This is a
chill we can ill afford, he pointed out, as free debate was the catalyst
for changing the disastrous policies of the Vietnam War and—even
74
more on point—Prohibition.
Given the mounting costs and
casualties of drug prohibition, Stevens warned against “silencing
opponents of the war on drugs” and stated that, in “the national
debate about a serious issue, it is the expression of the minority’s
viewpoint that most demands the protection of the First
75
Amendment.” Here Stevens identified the freedom to dissent at
school with the freedom to dissent in the society at large. It is a
linkage that we must insist upon not only because of the central
symbolic importance of school to understanding the broader
dynamics of participation in society, but because school is the
training ground for actual citizenship.
The staged retreat of the Court from Tinker has restored the
presumptive power of school authorities to censor, placing student
free speech rights in a straitjacket. The combined effect of the Fraser,
Hazelwood, and Morse decisions is to give schools censoring authority
when student speech is arguably sexual, indecent or inappropriate in
nature; when it risks offending any parents or any students; when it
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 2629.
Id. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2649.
Id.
Id. at 2651.
Id. at 2650–51.
Id. at 2651.
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seemingly implicates the name or authority of the school or one of its
activities; and when it is even jokingly questioning or non-judgmental
of drug prohibition or other prevailing social or legal taboos.
These various blows against Tinker have led to accelerating
censorship of school newspapers, yearbooks, magazines, and
theatrical productions around the country, as well as stepped up
discipline of students who inject “inappropriate” language into the
76
school environment. Many administrators now view themselves like
private shopping mall owners, most of whom (depending on which
state they operate in) get to control who says what, when and where
77
on their premises. Of course, even when Tinker was riding high, its
sweeping message did not penetrate all public schools, and its spirit
was often honored in the breach. Constitutional literacy exists at
alarmingly low levels in the country, and, despite the noble and
intensifying efforts of the Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy
78
Project and the long-standing work of Street Law, precious few high
school students know what their First Amendment rights are, much
less how to fight for them or where to go for help. (Despite Engel v.

76. The Student Press Law Center website has meticulously documented the
growing threat to student free speech and free press in the wake of these decisions.
For a continuing roundup of the fallout, see http://www.splc.org.
77. The Supreme Court found in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519–21 (1976),
that citizens in shopping malls have no First Amendment right to engage in political
speech, confining to its narrow facts the Court’s libertarian holding in Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In Marsh, the Court held that privately owned
“company towns” must permit First Amendment activity if they have invited the
public onto the property. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 509.
Several state courts have found free speech rights under state constitutional law for
citizens to petition and proselytize in shopping centers. See, e.g., N.J. Coal. Against
War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 760 (N.J. 1994) (finding,
however, that shopping centers may set “reasonable conditions” for such activity).
For a discussion of the fascinating line of shopping mall cases, see JAMIN B. RASKIN,
OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 174–79
(2003).
78. The Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy Project, headquartered at
American University’s Washington College of Law and founded in 1999, now
operates at numerous law schools, including Arizona State University Law School,
Drexel Law School, Howard Law School, Northeastern Law School, Rutgers Law
School, UC Berkeley Law School, the University of Louisville Law School, the
University of Oregon Law School, the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
Southern Law School, and Yale Law School. With the indispensable help of Mary
Beth Tinker herself, the Project sends law students who have done well in
constitutional law into public high schools to teach a full-blown semester-long course
in “constitutional literacy,” focused on all of the Supreme Court decisions that affect
students directly, beginning with the Tinker case. The Street Law Program, which was
launched in 1972 at Georgetown University to teach high school students about their
criminal procedure rights in dealing with police and the criminal justice system, also
has a presence on many campuses.
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Vitale, Lee v. Weisman, and other cases rejecting official prayer in
school contexts, I still frequently meet students who have been asked
to pray together at school, on the football field, or at graduation.)
Yet Tinker is still good law within its chiseled-down space. If its
judicial enemies have managed to place it in a straitjacket, they have
failed to give it the guillotine, and it has probably reached
entrenched and iconic cultural status, something like Miranda v.
81
82
Arizona, such that a direct overruling is unlikely. Of course, this
does not mean that there are not jurists and academics still calling for
its head. In his startlingly atavistic concurring opinion in Morse,
Justice Clarence Thomas unabashedly tried to refute the idea that
students have First Amendment rights and cited approvingly cases
from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in which state courts
upheld severe discipline, including corporal punishment, against
83
students simply for speaking against their masters. One case he
84
invoked, Wooster v. Sunderland, was a California appeals decision
affirming expulsion of a student for criticizing unsafe conditions at
85
his school that added up to what he saw as a significant fire hazard.
Nonetheless, the irony is that, while Tinker has been battered
internally in the field of education, its core meaning is more
compelling and relevant than ever outside of the school context.
Although Tinker’s wings have been clipped, the erosion of speech
rights in other institutional contexts means that now is precisely the
time for the Tinker principle to take flight.
III. ENCLAVES OF FREEDOM: THE PROMISE OF TINKER
There is a vigorous academic and judicial discourse about the
extent to which First Amendment protection should differ according
86
to the institutional context in which speech takes place.
The
79. 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (finding that the New York school system’s
compelled recitation of the Regent’s Prayer was wholly inconsistent with the
Establishment Clause).
80. 505 U.S. 577, 595–96 (1992) (rejecting the state’s argument that a prayer at
graduation was permissible because individuals may choose not to attend).
81. 396 U.S. 868 (1969).
82. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000) (“Miranda has
become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have
become part of our national culture.”).
83. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630–33 (2007).
84. 148 P. 959 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1915).
85. Id. at 960–61.
86. Compare Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 1256, 1264 (2005) (criticizing current doctrine as “institutionally oblivious”
and inattentive to the concrete social and institutional contexts that should
determine proper speech rules), with Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and
Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First
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Supreme Court has derived many different tests regarding the
protection of speech in various institutions, all of them balancing the
presumptively compelling interests of the institution—the public
employer, the military, the prison, the corporation, for example—
against the reduced speech interests of the citizen now operating in a
specific subordinate social role in the institution—the public
employee, the soldier, the prisoner, or the consumer/worker, to take
several important cases. These balancing tests tilt heavily against
individual speech from the start and almost always defeat the
individual’s claim against institutional censorship and control.
A. Public Employees Speaking Out
The Tinker analysis cuts though the morass of specific institutional
speech tests and sets straight the frameworks of analysis which are so
slanted and distorted. If we think about the common occurrence of a
public employee speaking against this or that government policy and
then being disciplined for it, the Tinker analysis offers a clean
solution. If the public employee is outside of the work context and
objects to a public policy, even one developed by the government
agency or office she works for, the speech cannot be sanctioned
because the employee is a complete rights-bearing citizen, whose
political speech receives full and equal First Amendment protection.
The government should have no more power to retaliate against that
employee-citizen than a school has to retaliate against a student who,
from an off-campus location, criticizes his or her school.
The trickier case is the public employee whose at-work political
speech or policy critique is considered offensive or disruptive by her
employer and is punished for it. Here, the Tinker analysis reminds us
Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1639 (2007) (pointing out that Schauer
ignores the fact that courts actually “tailor too much” in certain institutions, chiefly
schools, workplaces and prisons; rejecting arguments for institutional doctrinal
tailoring based on theories of individual waiver or the costs of risk and error; and
arguing for an intermediate level of scrutiny in these settings). The most
authoritative treatment of the subject is Robert Post’s lucid work Constitutional
Domains, which argues that the law partitions “the social world among different forms
of social order,” which he calls management, community and democracy, in order to
regulate behavior and that First Amendment jurisprudence “divides social life into”
these “discrete domains” as well. POST, supra note 5, at 2–3. However, the helpful
image of law partitioning social life into different domains may be overdrawn when it
comes to specific institutions since these categories may be more usefully seen as
competing values within institutions that appear and reappear in different
proportions in different contexts. A school is neither just a managerial instrument of
public policy nor just a manifestation of community values nor just a domain of
collective and individual democracy, but a mixture of all three. The genius of Tinker
was to find that the democratic imperative could not be obviated unless it actually
thwarted the other two values.
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that the public employee is still—irreducibly and commendably—a
citizen, a member of the broader sovereign community empowered
and invited to contribute to public discourse. The employee’s
supervisors cannot punish her simply because they are made to feel
“uncomfortable” or defensive by her speech. That is the pointed
message of Tinker: a citizen’s speech may not be suppressed by an
institution out of a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
87
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”
The public employer that seeks to censor must rather show,
according to the Tinker framework, that the employee’s speech will
“materially and substantially” interfere with the work of the
88
government agency or invade “the rights of others.”
In essence, the employee can be punished for her speech only if it
literally keeps her from doing her job or thwarts the operations of the
institution. Thus, a uniformed police officer cannot walk off duty to
go make speeches at public rallies about sexism on the police force.
This is not because she is forbidden to have opinions about the police
force, but rather because she is needed, and contractually obligated,
at that point to be at work. But surely she should be able to use her
day off to go make such a speech (in plain clothes), even if her
superiors disagree with it. Similarly, if she writes an internal office
memorandum about why she thinks a particular police action
violated the constitutional rights of suspects, her superiors do not
have to follow her advice to dismiss charges, but surely they cannot
retaliate against her for expressing, in professional good faith, a
different point of view. The institution’s mission must integrate
flexibly the principles of democratic dialogue and internal dissent
that flow from the First Amendment, and an “undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance” can never be “enough to overcome the
89
right to freedom of expression.”
When we compare this Tinker-informed approach to actual First
Amendment doctrine controlling the field of public employee
speech, we find the latter seriously deficient and disappointing. The
90
most recent Supreme Court decision, Garcetti v. Ceballos, involved a
deputy district attorney who wrote an office disposition
memorandum expressing grave reservations about falsehoods
contained in a police affidavit that was used to obtain a criminal

87.
88.
89.
90.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
Id. at 513.
Id. at 508.
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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91

search warrant. In the memorandum, he recommended dismissal
92
of the case. For his strong position, the employee suffered a series
93
of retaliatory adverse job actions. When he sued, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld his claim, finding that
the subject matter of his memorandum was “inherently a matter of
94
public concern” within the meaning of the Court’s prior decision in
95
Pickering v. Board of Education. Having determined that the memo
met the public-concern criterion, the Ninth Circuit balanced
Ceballos’s speech interests against the District Attorney’s interest in
96
punishing it.
It decided in Ceballos’s favor because the District
Attorney “failed even to suggest disruption or inefficiency in the
workings of the District Attorney’s Office” as a consequence of the
97
position he took in the memo. The managers simply disapproved of
what he was saying. Under Tinker, this is an easy and intuitive result.
But the Supreme Court majority, with Justice Anthony Kennedy
writing, promptly reversed. It determined first that Ceballos was not
98
speaking as a citizen on public matters. If he had been, even that
fact would not have been dispositive according to the Court because
it found that public employees speaking as citizens on public matters
still have to face “those speech restrictions that are necessary for their
99
employers to operate efficiently and effectively,” a loose standard
that swallows up a lot of what should be absolutely protected political
speech in civil society.
In any event, Justice Kennedy found that Ceballos was speaking
only as an employee executing his public duties, not as a citizen on a
public issue, and “when public employees make statements pursuant
to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate

91. Id. at 414.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 415 (describing alleged retaliations such as position reassignment,
transfer to another courthouse, and denial of promotion).
94. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 410
(2006).
95. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
96. See Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1173 (applying a two-step test derived from the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) and Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)). The two-step test first asks whether the speech
involves a matter of public concern and, if so, whether the interests in allowing the
expression outweigh the government’s interests “in promoting workplace efficiency
and avoiding workplace disruption.” Hufford v. McEnaney, 249 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th
Cir. 2001).
97. Id. at 1180.
98. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
99. Id. at 419.
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their communications from employer discipline.”
The majority
thus bifurcated the analysis, finding that public employees speaking
as citizens have some measure of rights left to be balanced against the
public employer’s interest but that public employees speaking in the
line of duty have none whatsoever and can presumptively be
101
punished for their views.
This whole approach capsizes Tinker. After all, Justice Fortas’s
opinion began by declaring that neither students nor teachers shed
their First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse gate, thereby
implying that those rights exist in full for students and teachers before
they enter the schoolhouse gate. Justice Fortas never would have
implied, much less found, that a student outside of school must have
his First Amendment rights subjected to “those speech restrictions
that are necessary” for his school “to operate efficiently and
102
effectively,” a giant and dangerously plastic standard.
Indeed, at
that point, students or public employees would have their First
Amendment rights subjected to a statist balancing operation
wherever and whenever they speak on public things. According to
this approach, students and (especially) teachers would be shedding
their First Amendment rights before they ever get to school.
More to the point, the basic meaning of the Tinker decision was
that a student at school is still a citizen clothed with constitutional
rights that she does not surrender simply because she is in a learning
relationship with teachers paid by the government. Yet, Justice
Kennedy essentially finds that a public employee does shed his First
Amendment rights entering the gates of the government workplace.
That cannot be right; it confuses the legitimate expectations that the
government has in getting employees to do their work with the
citizen-employee’s total sacrifice of the free speech rights constitutive
of democratic citizenship. Surely it is legitimate to prevent a math
teacher from using class time to propagandize against the president
of the school board or of the United States because class time (except
perhaps for a few minutes of “warm-up”) is for discussion of class
material. But a math teacher should never be punished for speaking
outside of school, or within school in an appropriate context, in a way
that is critical of government authority. For example, a teacher who
objects at a staff meeting to a new course schedule cannot be
punished simply for disagreeing with the principal. Yet, according to
Justice Kennedy, even if the positions she takes are in the line of duty,
100. Id. at 421.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 419.

1212

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1193

are in good faith, and threaten no institutional disruption, her
employer can still punish her for dissenting simply because she is
acting as an “employee” and not a “citizen.” This is workplace
authoritarianism pure and simple.
The majority’s interpretation undermines the breadth and
complexity of democratic citizenship. The word “employee” defines
one of the crucial roles played by most every democratic citizen, not a
category of disembodied servants outside of the processes of
constitutional sovereignty and government. As Justice Stevens
observes in dissent, “public employees are still citizens while they are
in the office. The notion that there is a categorical difference
between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course of one’s
103
employment is quite wrong.”
In his dissenting opinion in Ceballos, Justice Souter also makes this
crucial point, but the standard that he offers for deciding whether
work-related speech is protected by the First Amendment is itself
exceedingly stingy towards expression and seems makeshift and
unprincipled. He argues that the government can punish an
employee’s speech unless the employee (1) “speaks on a matter of
unusual importance,” and (2) “satisfies high standards of
104
responsibility in the way he does it.”
He suggests that “only
comment on official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action,
other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety can weigh
105
out in an employee’s favor.”
This puzzling standard creates content-based hurdles for the
employee to clear and shifts the burden back to her to show that she
has acted in an extremely responsible way to talk about unusually
important things. Even if we knew what these words meant, the
standard itself fundamentally betrays the First Amendment, whose
coverage, we know from Tinker, properly extends to any topic or
subject and which allows anyone to take any position they want. If a
public employee is meeting all her professional responsibilities and
getting her job done, by what right does the state punish her for her
views and demand that she make an extraordinary justification for
them?
The only issue that should be in play is this: whether the
employee’s “civic” speech at work is either preventing her from
completing her basic work assignments and duties, or is
fundamentally thwarting the ability of the agency, as a whole, to
103. Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting).
105. Id.

2009]

NO ENCLAVES OF TOTALITARIANISM

1213

accomplish its democratically validated institutional goals and
mission. Short of either of those difficult proofs, the state must
accept the individual expression of employees as a cost—and in truth,
what is often more likely, a great benefit—of having a public
workplace in a pluralist democracy.
For his part, Justice Breyer, in dissent, just mixes further vagueness
into the discussion. He suggests that a court can protect a public
employee’s speech only if it “(1) involves a matter of public concern
and also (2) takes place in the course of ordinary job-related duties,”
and then the court also finds an “augmented need for constitutional
protection and diminished risk of undue judicial interference with
106
governmental management of the public’s affairs.” This language,
which is vague and circular, also falls dramatically short of the lucid
Tinker standard.
The irony here is that, because public school teachers are
themselves public employees, they now have fewer rights to object to
school policy in an office memo than their own students theoretically
have to object to it in a leaflet they bring to school. A teacher can be
reprimanded and disciplined for going through channels to register
dissent about school policy, while a student cannot be retaliated
against at all for speaking or writing against it. The paradox flows out
of the abandonment of Tinker’s elevation of democratic values over
managerial ones. While students have still not (entirely) shed their
First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse gate, teachers mostly
have.
B. Soldiers at Work and Citizens on Base
The weakness of speech protections for public employees is only
compounded and magnified when the employees involved are
members of our armed services. One observer approvingly notes the
consistent “judicial deference to government authorities” shown by
the Supreme Court in military speech cases, an extreme deference
that “has been justified on the grounds that the Constitution entrusts
the regulation of the military to the Legislative and Executive
107
branches.”
Of course, this constitutional fact should be no more
destructive of the free speech rights of soldiers than should the fact
that the Constitution entrusts regulation of schools to state and local
governments destroy the free speech claims of students. Indeed, it is

106. Id. at 449–50 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107. John A. Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community: Striking a Balance Between
Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 45 A.F. L. REV. 303, 306 (1998).
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one thing for society to fully entrust the management of a public
function to a particular agency, quite another to entrust to it the
simultaneous defense of constitutional liberties within.
Indeed, this claim about essentially unreviewable institutional
prerogatives is precisely the argument for complete deference to
local school authorities and principals that Justice Frankfurter made
unsuccessfully in dissent in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
108
109
Barnette and Justice Black made unsuccessfully in dissent in Tinker.
Both arguments were rejected by the Court’s majority, which did not
understand constitutional liberty to be a presumptive threat to
bureaucratic efficiency.
In a democratic society, bureaucratic
efficiency must be defined in a way that incorporates democratic
liberty as public purposes are being implemented. All of our social
institutions may be derived from, and regulated by, legislative and
executive power, but that fact does not displace the continuing force
of the Bill of Rights. Agencies implementing our laws do not judge
their own cases and are not left to their own devices in protecting
constitutional rights and values along the way. It bears reminding:
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
110
to say what the law is.”
Yet, Supreme Court jurisprudence has been so lopsided on soldier
free speech claims that judicial review is in fact purely academic in
this field. As Captain John Carr notes, “the military may impose
restrictions on the speech of military personnel whenever the speech
poses a significant threat to discipline, morale, esprit de corps, or
111
civilian supremacy.”
That is, it can do so essentially whenever it
wants.
The vast doctrinal justifications for censorship leave our service
members quite exposed indeed when it comes to their First
Amendment rights. To be sure, no one thinks that the First
112
Amendment is completely irrelevant to military cases, but the
Supreme Court has repeatedly found that it applies with extremely
diluted force.

108. 319 U.S. 624, 667–68 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
109. 393 U.S. 503, 523 (Black, J., dissenting).
110. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
111. Carr, supra note 107, at 306.
112. Even in Goldman v. Weinberger, which rejected a Jewish service member’s claim
to wear a yarmulke against a military rule banning headdress, the Court grudgingly
acknowledged that the difficult requirements of “military life do not, of course,
render entirely nugatory in the military context the guarantees of the First
Amendment.” 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986).
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Consider a leading case, Parker v. Levy, to see how a Tinkerinflected standard would compare to the Court’s actual approach.
Parker was an army captain and chief of dermatology at Fort Jackson
in South Carolina, who made a number of statements critical of the
Vietnam War to enlisted personnel at the Army hospital in the course
114
of his work. The Army pressed charges, and he was convicted by a
court-martial of violating three different Articles of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, including Article 133, which proscribes any
“conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,” and Article 134,
which forbids “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good
order and discipline” and “conduct of a nature to bring discredit
115
upon the armed forces.” He was dismissed, subjected to forfeiture,
116
and sentenced to three years of hard labor.
The Third Circuit
reversed his convictions on the grounds that these provisions were
117
unconstitutionally vague as applied to his statements. Surely this is
right: how could he reasonably have known that his anti-war
statements would run afoul of the “officer and a gentleman” and
“good order and discipline” clauses?
But there is, of course, a more fundamental problem at work. Even
had notice been given, the Tinker standard suggests that the Army
should not be able to punish him for making political statements
about the Vietnam War unless the speech threatens a “substantial and
material disruption” of the war effort, which was not alleged, or
frustration of his specific assignment (successful operation of the
dermatology service), which also was not alleged. He cannot be
punished simply for disagreeing with the government or the war or
because his speech made superiors feel uncomfortable or vaguely
apprehensive that it would somehow undermine military morale or
the war effort.
Yet, the Supreme Court, in a sweeping opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, reversed and reinstated Parker’s criminal convictions,
invoking the specialized nature of military life and its differences
from civilian life and insisting upon the “different purposes of the

113. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
114. Id. at 736–37. Parker accused the United States of waging a racist war that
non-white military personnel should avoid supporting. Id. He described the actions
of Special Forces personnel as deceptive and accused them of killing innocent
women and children. Id.
115. Id. at 738 nn.3–4.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 740 (referencing the holding in Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 793 (3d
Cir. 1973), and reversing the conviction on the grounds that Articles 133 and 134 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice are unconstitutional).
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two communities.” While soldiers “enjoy many of the same rights”
as civilians do, Justice Rehnquist argued, they do not possess “the
same autonomy” because their “function is to carry out the policies”
119
of their “civilian superiors.”
Justice Rehnquist stated that the
“different character of the military community and of the military
mission,” rooted in the “fundamental necessity for obedience” and
“necessity for imposition of discipline,” justifies the overriding of free
120
speech rights within the military.
In other words, the armed
services must, at all times, be a total authoritarian institution where
soldiers operate in a command system that excludes their identity as
citizens of a constitutional democracy.
121
In Greer v. Spock, this command-and-control paradigm even
squelched the rights of civilians to make political connections to
soldiers and to engage in political speech on military bases. In that
1976 case arising from the 1972 presidential election, People’s Party
presidential candidate Dr. Benjamin Spock and his running mate
Julius Hobson notified Fort Dix of their intention to enter the fiftyfive square mile army reservation to meet with service personnel and
122
pass out campaign literature.
They were denied permission to
123
Spock
enter the base, even the public areas like roads and parks.
won injunctive relief from the Third Circuit, but the Supreme Court
reversed, ruling that it is “‘the primary business of armies and navies
124
to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise,’” and
that “it is consequently the business of a military installation like Fort
125
Dix to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum.”
This decision presupposes that a social institution, at least a
military one, can have only one purpose and that all other purposes
are, by definition, incompatible. It would be as if the Tinker Court
had decided that “the primary business of public education is to
impart official curricular materials to students, and it is consequently
the business of a school to train students, not to provide a public
forum.” This approach not only elevates the “management” function

118. Id. at 751.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 758.
121. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
122. Id. at 832.
123. See id. at 833 n.3 (describing the denial of Spock and Hobson’s request and
relying on Fort Dix Regulations 210-26 and 210-27, which prohibit political speeches
and the distribution of literature without prior approval).
124. See id. at 838 (quoting United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17
(1955)).
125. Id.
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over “democracy,” in Post’s terms, but extinguishes democracy
entirely from the picture, depriving citizens of their rightful portion
of continuing democratic sovereignty. As Justice Brennan says in
dissent, the majority decision makes clear that “there is no longer
room, under any circumstance, for the unapproved exercise of public
127
expression on a military base.”
But why not? The appearance of the world’s leading pediatrician
and other anti-war activists on the base should be no more
presumptively disruptive of military functioning than the appearance
to speak of Members of Congress and other routine guests on
military bases. Even if uninvited guests appear to pass out literature
in a common area or the sidewalk, all of the soldiers remain subject
to their military duties and orders. At the very least, Dr. Spock and
company should be allowed on the public portions of the base to
engage in political discussion until there is a real threat of material
disruption of military preparedness and training.
An
128
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” should
never be enough to defeat the free speech rights of citizens and, in
this case, acting on such fear looks like naked political censorship.
The people who defend democracy with arms should be able to enjoy
democracy unless the two goals become incompatible.
However, we see that the Tinker standard has not touched the
whole system of speech regulation in the armed services. Soldiers,
like public employees more generally, have fewer rights of expressive
dissent than students do in school. And citizens who seek to go on
military bases in fact shed their First Amendment rights in the
process.
Of course, this brief, suggestive canvass barely scratches the surface
of the repressive doctrines controlling expression in the public
workplace and the military, much less other social institutions like the
private workplace and the prison. But the general point holds.
Tinker remains the beacon of expressive freedom in institutional life
and the most lucid and robust standard for protecting democratic
liberty over the long haul against the incessant and totalizing claims
of entrenched institutional power. It is the freedom-centered
reasoning of Tinker that holds promise for preventing the institutions
that flow out of government from dissolving into partitioned and
129
gated “enclaves of totalitarianism.”
126.
127.
128.
129.

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Greer, 424 U.S. at 851 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
Id. at 511.
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IV. DEMOCRATIC DISRUPTION AND THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS
In public schools today, Tinker is as conceptually relevant as it ever
was. All across the country, schools are struggling with the proper
treatment of irreverent student expression. Moreover, the advent of
the Internet means that a whole new generation of issues has grown
up around official efforts to punish off-campus student speech on
web sites that gossip about student life or disparage school officials or
130
teachers.
In these cases, which have not made it to the Supreme
Court yet, the lower courts seem clear that the only speech on
students’ private web sites punishable by schools is that which
threatens actual harm to other members of the community or
131
otherwise substantially disrupts the educational process. Tinker thus
not only makes schools internally safe for democratic freedom but
provides the surest guidance to school officials on how to proceed in
disentangling fair criticism and personal opinion uttered off campus
from those true threats made to members of the learning community.
Handled properly, the Internet age could usher in a new birth of
student freedom of expression. Given that web sites are radically free
and off-limits to official control in all but the most extreme cases,
shrewd officials might think twice before using their handy HazelwoodFraser-Morse powers at school to censor student expression and drive it
off campus into the wild world of cybertalk, where teachers, coaches,
and school mentors have no sway at all. It will benefit everyone if
educators resist the urge to censor and instead engage students in
serious intellectual and political dialogue at school, testing their
youthful dogmas and probing their provisional certainties, teasing
out their valuable and provocative insights, and helping them trim
away that which is unfair, sleazy, or irresponsible. This is the path of
true education, which is to say the path of true freedom. It is a path
many schools have already chosen. It is indeed the path of Tinker.
The Tinker standard, of course, has two parts. The student may not
be punished for speech unless it threatens a “substantial disruption of
132
or material interference with”
the educational process or
133
“impinge[s] upon the rights of other students.” The vitality of the
standard depends upon the courts treating “substantial disruption” in
130. See generally David J. Fryman, Note, When the Schoolhouse Gate Extends Online:
Student Free Speech in the Internet Age, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 557
(2009) (explaining efforts to apply or modify prevailing student speech case law to
address issues arising out of the use of the Internet for student expression).
131. See id. at 571–85 (summarizing varying approaches in federal case law to
student speech on the Internet).
132. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
133. Id. at 509.
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a serious and liberty-protective way. Indeed, it was key to the Tinker
decision itself that the Court saw Mary Beth’s black armband
intervention into school discussion not as a disruptive threat to the
educational process, but as a stimulating enrichment of it. But much
of the judicial controversy in interpreting and applying Tinker
necessarily focuses on what is disruptive and what is not. The “rights
of others” prong has been mostly ignored or implicitly assimilated
into the “disruption” analysis.
But the future progress of the Tinker standard may turn on our
capacity to shift emphasis and see how the rights of others should in
fact be the principal object of our examination. Mary Beth’s black
armband did not threaten anyone else’s rights unless we make the
mistake that her principal did by assuming that students (or people
generally) have the right not to be offended or upset by someone
else’s speech. That is not a right that appears anywhere in the
Constitution, and it is plainly not a right compatible with the First
Amendment. On the other hand, students do have a right under
state and federal law to an education, so Mary Beth’s speech would
lose its protection at the point at which it becomes so oppressive,
discordant and pervasive that no one else can learn: an anti-war
filibuster in French class or racist tirade in English would be good
examples. Short of that kind of showing, the right to speak must be
integrated into the fabric of the educational process itself. The
Barnette and Tinker decisions instruct that this is not only an essential
safeguard against social authoritarianism but the source of
democratic renewal.
Similarly, if we think about Ceballos’s memorandum, nothing in it
remotely interfered with anyone else’s rights. On the contrary, its
whole purpose was to see that a criminal defendant’s constitutional
rights were fairly enforced. The rights of no one in the District
Attorney’s office were threatened at all. To be sure, his superiors had
the right to reject his advice, as they did, and had no obligation to
accept his perspective on things. But controversy and disagreement
are in the nature of policy discussion and contestation in the
institutional life of a democratic society. It is hard to see how
Ceballos’s speech can become a lawful basis for discipline unless we
treat the mysterious will of the bureaucracy itself as sacrosanct and
unchallengeable.
Even in the more difficult case of soldiers’ free speech in the
military, a focus on the rights of others is fundamentally illuminating.
When Dr. Parker expressed his deep scepticism about the Vietnam
War at the military hospital, others might have disagreed with him or
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even been offended by his position, but no one’s rights were violated
in any way. Perhaps the interests of the state were, in some distant
and remote way, troubled by his anti-war activism, but if that is the
constitutional basis for discipline, the state should have to make a far
more compelling showing that there was an actual material and
substantial disruption; the “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance” should never be enough to justify censorship and
punishment of speech by citizens.
In the final analysis, Tinker furnishes to us a provocative challenge
and a standing invitation. It challenges us to make the promise of
democratic freedom real in all of society’s institutions, even those
most determined to operate as “enclaves of totalitarianism.” And it
invites us to actually carve out space, at least in the interstices and
margins of all of our social institutions, for citizens to speak and to
hear one another, to engage in the unending and pervasive
conversation that defines and constitutes political democracy.

